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Peer Abuse in Public Schools: Should Schools Be
Liable for Student to Student Injuries Under
Section 1983?
In recent years, the scope of civil rights claims under 42
U.S.C. 5 1983 has been expanded.' This expansion has significantly affected public schools. Schools have become a place
where the civil rights of students and employees have limited
school officials' authority and augmented their responsibilities.
For example, in a recent Texas case, the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals held that a school principal could be held s u p e ~ s o r i l y
liable when a teacher had sexual relations with a fifteen-yearold student? In New York, a federal district court allowed a
student to bring a claim against his school for verbal and physical abuse from other students3 In Utah, a teacher was fired
after the school found out that the police arrested and charged
him with selling drugs.' Later, the Salt Lake police department dismissed the charges when the teacher agreed to become
1. 42 U.S.C. 5 1983 (1988).
2. Doe v. Taylor Indep. Sch. Dist., 15 F.3d 443 (5th Cir. 1994), cert. denied,
115 S. Ct. 70 (1994). In Doe, the principal's motion for summary judgment was
denied and the case was remanded to the trial court to see if the principal's failure to take corrective action against a teacher rose to the level of deliberate indifference.
3. Pagano v. Massapequa Pub. Sch., 714 F. Supp. 641 (E.D.N.Y.1989). This
case may be an aberration. Currently, six circuit courts have reached the opposite
result based on the Supreme Court's holding in DeShaney v. winnebago County
Department of Social Services, 489 US. 189 (1989). See infia note 116 and accompanying text.
However, there are exceptions to the DeShuney holding. These exceptions arise
when the state creates a special relationship with individuals that are within the
custody of the state. DeShuney, 489 U.S. at 198. According to the DeShuney Court,
a special duty is created when the state takes individuals into custody, such as
criminals and mental patients. Id. at 198-99.
In Doe v. New York City Department of Social Services, the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals expanded the special relationship doctrine by holding that such a
relationship was created when a child was put into a foster home. 649 F.2d 134
(2d Cir. 1981). The Pagano court stated that Pagano was more akin to Doe than
DeShaney. Pagano, 714 F. Supp. at 643. Thus, the state owed a duty under the
doctrine of parens patriae to the school children under its care at the time the
incidents took place. Id. See generally Gail P. Sorenson, School District Liability for
Federal Civil Rights Violations Under Section 1983, 76 EDUC.LAWREP. 3 13, 32328 (1992) (discussing alternative justifications for allowing a special relationship in
the public school context).
4. Ambus v. Granite Bd. of Educ., 975 F.2d 1555, 1558 (10th Cir. 1992).
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an inf~rmant.~
The teacher then filed a suit against the school
district for wrongful dismissal and was awarded over
$200,000.6
With such high stakes, school officials need to be aware of
the liability that section 1983 creates for their schools. Of
course, this is more easily said than done. Section 1983 jurisprudence is so complex that essential elements of a section
1983 claim are easily overlooked.' Because section 1983 is so
complex, this Comment cannot discuss all aspects of section
1983 claims in the public school arena. Therefore, this Comment will focus on the section 1983 liability of school officials
and districts when students injure other students (peer abuse).
However, in order to understand the peer abuse issue, it is
essential to know the background of section 1983 and the prima facie elements necessary t o establish a section 1983 case in
the educational arena.
Thus, part I will give a brief history of section 1983. Part
I1 will outline the elements needed to bring a cause of action
under section 1983. Part I11 will analyze whether school officials are or should be liable for deprivation of rights caused by
peer abuse under section 1983. Part IV draws some conclusions
from the analysis.

A. The Early History of Section 1983
Section 1983 was originally passed as section 1of the Civil
Rights Act of 187lO8
This Act was passed primarily in response
t o the "growing terrorism of [the] Ku Klux Klan."g

5. Id.
6. Interview with Byron Fischer, attorney for the defendant Board of Education in Ambus, in Provo, Utah (Sept. 19, 1994). The amount of damages is not
listed in the reported case.
7. See, e.g., Seamons v. Snow, 864 F. Supp. 1111, 1119-22 @. Utah 1994).
Seamons involved a group of students hazing another student in a northern Utah
school. Id. The court dismissed the 5 1983 claim because the plaintiff failed to
show a constitutional interest that was deprived. Id. at 1122. For a discussion of
the prima facie elements of a § 1983 claim, see i e a part 11.
8. Monell v. Dep't of Social Sews., 436 U.S. 658, 692 n.57 (1978); Leon
Friedman, New Developments in Civil Rights Litigation and Trends in Section 1983
Actiom, C902 A.L.1.-A.B.A. 129, 131 (1994).
9. See Friedman, w p m note 8, at 131.
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The Act was passed essentially as introduced by Congressman Samuel Shellabarger.l0 The part now codified as section
1983 was passed without amendment and with very little debate." Thus, legislative history is scarce for interpreting section 1983. In spite of the lack of legislative history, the Supreme Court has reasoned that Congress passed the Ku Klux
Klan Act in order to provide federal relief and remedies to
individuals who were being deprived of their federal rights
because local officials were unwilling or unable t o enforce the
federal laws.l2
Although this Act was passed in 1871, it was essentially
disregarded for the first seventy years after its passage.13 It
was not until 1939 that the Court held that the rights to assemble and to distribute literature were within the protection
of section 1983.14 This holding was the first modern holding
by which citizens were protected from the states under the
Fourteenth Amendment.15 However, the real power of section
1983 was not recognized until Monroe u. Pape.16

B. Monroe's Impact on Section 1983
In 1961, the Court expanded the scope and power of section 1983 in Monroe u. Pape.17 In Monroe, thirteen Chicago
police officers broke into James Monroe's apartment without a
search warrant in the early morning.18 They routed the Monroe household from bed, "made them stand naked in the living
room, and ransacked every room, emptying drawers and ripping mattress cover^."'^ Mr. Monroe was also taken t o the police station, held in custody for ten hours, and interrogated

10. Id.
11. Id.
12. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 171-76 (1961), overruled in part by
Monell v. Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Steven S. Cushman, Municipal Liability Under 6 1983: Toward a New Definition of Municipal Policymaker, 34
B.C. L. REV. 693, 694-95 (1993).
13. Friedman, supm note 8, at 135.
14. Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939); see Friedman, supra note 8, at 135.
15. Friedman, supra note 8, at 135.
16. 365 U.S. 167 (1961), overruled in part by Monell v. Dep't of Social Servs.,
436 U.S. 658 (1978).
17. 365 U.S. 167 (1961), overruled in part by Monell v. Dep't of Social Servs.,
436 U.S. 658 (1978).
18. Id. at 169.
19. Id.
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about a two-day-old murder2' He never saw a judge, no
charges were filed against him, and he was not allowed to call
his family or an att~rney.~'
The Monroes brought a suit claiming among other things, that their civil rights had been violated under section 1983.22The City of Chicago and the officers
moved t o dismiss, claiming that section 1983 did not provide a
cause of action.23The U.S. Su~remeCourt held that there was
a cause of action for damages against the police officers, but
not against the city?
Monroe affected the law in two significant ways. First,
section 1983 was expanded so plaintiffs could bring "damage
suits against state officer^."^' Previously, such suits had been
limited t o prospective injunctive relief.26
Second, damages were available only against individuals.
In Monroe, a municipality did not qualify as a "person" under
section 1983.~'Thus, Chicago was not liable for the acts of the
police officers? This second holding essentially exempted
municipalities from liability for damages under section 1983.29
The Court justified this holding based on the failed Sherman
Amendment to the Civil Rights Act of 1871.30The Sherman
Amendment would have made a municipality liable for any
acts of violence committed by riotous persons assembled within
its b~undaries.~'
This would have placed a tremendous burden
on the municipality to keep the peace. Although section 1983 is
much narrower than the Sherman Amendment, the Court used

20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 170.
24. Id. at 172, 187.
25. Friedman, supm note 8, at 135. Such suits extend to state officers in
their individual capacity, not their official capacity. If state officers were liable in
their official capacity, it would be the same as the state being directly liable for
the harm caused by its official. The court in Monroe specitically exempted the municipality from liability for the a d s of its officials. Monroe, 365 U.S. 167, 187
(1961), overruled in part by Monell v. Dep't of Social Sews. of New York, 436 U.S.
658 (1978).
26. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 167 n.14, 169 nn.17-18 (1985).
27. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 191.
28. Id. at 187.
29. Although states and municipalities were not liable for damages under §
1983, both could be sued for prospective injunctive relief by suing their officers in
their official capacity. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. at 167 11.14, 169 nn.1718.
30. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 188-91; Cushman, supra note 12, at 699.
31. Monroe, 365 US. at 188-91.

2371

PEER ABUSE IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS

241

Congress' antagonistic reaction to the Sherman Amendment to
justify not classifying a municipality as a person."

C. From Monroe to Monell
The Monroe rule, which limited the liability of a municipality, was overturned seventeen years later in Monell v. Department of Social Services of New York City.33In 1978, the Court
in Monell held that a municipality could be classified as a person under section 1 9 8 3 . ~However, the Court limited the
scope of this liability to official municipality policies that
"cause" a n employee to violate another's constitutional
rights.35 In other words, a municipality is not liable for the
tortious acts of its employees under the theory of respondeat
superiorS6unless there is a final decision made by an official

32. Id. at 191.
33. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
34. Id. In Monell, female employees of the Department of Social Services and
the Board of Education of New York City brought a class action suit. Id. at 66061. These women had been forced to take unpaid leaves of absence before such
leaves were medically necessary. Id.
35. Id. at 691-92. The Court in Monell clearly limited municipal liability to
a d s by its employees that were directed by official policy:
[A] municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat
superior theory.
We begin with the language of 5 1983 as originally passed:
"[Alny person who, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any State, shall subject, or cause to be
subjected, any person . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution of the United States,
shall, any such law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage
of the State to the contrary notwithstanding, be liable to the party
injured in any action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . . ." (emphasis added).
The italicized language plainly imposes liability on a government that,
under color of some ofiial policy, "causes" a n employee to violate
.
another's constitutional rights.
Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted). Many commentators have discussed
Monnell's impact and scope on public schools. See Cushman, supra note 12; Jeff
Homer, When Is a School District Liable Under 42 U.S.C. 19832-The Evolution of
the "Policy or Custom" Requirement, 64 EDUC.L. REP. 339, 340 (1991); Sorenson,
supra note 3, at 314-16.
36. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691-92. The Court justified this limitation based on
Congress' treatment of the Sherman Amendment, which indicates that Congress did
not desire to impose vicarious liability on the municipality based on the actions of
a few private citizens. Id. at 691 11.57.However, municipal liability for a d s of its
own employees is distinguishable from liability for acts of all private citizens within a specified jurisdiction. Id. The Court was persuaded that the Sherman Amendment evidenced an opposition by Congress to vicarious responsibility and a lack of
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policymaker that causes a municipal employee to violate the
constitutional rights of anothere3'
After Monell opened the door for section 1983 suits against
local municipalities, the question arose whether the state or its
agencies could be held liable under section 1983 as well. The
Supreme Court put that question t o rest in Will v. Michigan
Department of State Police.38The Court held that neither the
State nor any of its officials acting in their official capacities
are persons under section 1983.39Thus, if a school district is
classified as an arm of the state, it is not liable for damages
under section 1983.40Conversely, if the school district is not
considered an arm of the state, it is subject t o liability under
section 1983 if the other prima facie elements of a section 1983
claim are met? The question of whether the school is an arm

intent to bind the municipality through its employees. Id. The Court combined
these two factors to reject the argument that a municipality could be liable under
$ 1983 based on the doctrine of respondeat superior. Id.
37. Id. at 690-91. See generally Horner, supra note 35 (discussing the role of
the policy and policymaker to create liability for public schools under $ 1983).
38. 491 U.S. 58 (1989). In Will, the plaintiff filed a suit in state court against
the Department of State Police when he was denied a promotion. Id. at 60. The
plaintiff alleged that he was denied the promotion because his brother had been a
student activist about whom the department had maintained a "red squad" me. Id.
39. Id. at 70-71. Will is difficult to understand without the background of the
Eleventh Amendment. This amendment reserves rights to the states, but Congress
can abrogate the Eleventh Amendment under $ five of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Id. at 66; Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 227 (1989). Congress can also abrogate
the Eleventh Amendment under the Commerce Clause. See P e ~ s y l v a n i av. Union
Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 15 (1989) (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, Blackmun,
Stevens and Scalia, JJ., concurring in that part of the opinion). However, to abrogate Eleventh Amendment state rights, "Congress must make its intention [to abrogate] unmistakably clear." Hoffman v. Connecticut Dep't of Income Main., 492 U.S.
96, 101 (1989); Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 228 (1989); Atascadem State
Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985). The Court has held that Congress did
not intend t o abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment rights when it passed $
1983 because Congress' intention to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment was not
clear. Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 338-45 (1979). Thus, the only way to make a
state liable is a congressional amendment to $ 1983.
40. See, e.g., Martinez v. Board of Educ., 748 F.2d 1393 (10th Cir. 1984)
(holding that school districts within the state of New Mexico are an arm of the
state and therefore not subject to $ 1983); Martinez v. Board of Educ., 724 F.
Utah 1989) (holding school board is an arm of the state), overruled
Supp. 857 0.
by Ambus v. Granite Bd. of Educ., 975 F.2d 1555 (10th Cir. 1992) (holding school
board is not an arm of the state).
41. Ambus, 975 F.2d 1555 (holding that school districts within the state of
Utah are not an arm of the state, and therefore are subject to § 1983). The Tenth
Circuit has decided cases both ways depending upon its interpretation of state
laws. Compare Ambus, 975 F.2d at 1555 (holding that a school district is not an
arm of the state, thus subject to $ 1983 claims) with Martinez, 748 F.2d at 1393
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of the state, and thus a person under section 1983 is discussed
below.42

The elements of section 1983 are set forth in title 42 of the
United States Code:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the
District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be
liable to the party injured in an action a t law, suit in equity,
or other proper proceeding for redress?

Aside from this sentence, Congress has given little guidance for
section 1983 civil rights ~ l a i m sThus,
. ~ the meaning of section
1983 elements have been promulgated by the courts. This promulgation has created a complex body of judicial law, which
augments the importance of understanding each essential element as applied in the educational context. The following four
elements, extracted from 42 U.S.C. 5 1983, have been the subject of most of the litigation in the educational arena:
A person who
under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any State
who subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen or
other person,
a deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws shall be liable to
the injured party.45
Each of these elements is necessary to establishing a prima
facie case. If the defendant can show that any one of these
elements is missing, the section 1983 claim will fail.

(holding that a school district is an arm fo the state, thus not subject to 8 1983
claims) For the elements of a 8 1983 claim, see i&ra part 11.
42. See infia part IIA.
43. 42 U.S.C.8 1983 (1988).
44. See supra part IA.
45. Cf. 42 U.S.C. 8 1983 (1988).
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A. Who or What Is a Person?

Three broad classes of persons can be sued under section
1983: a person in an individual capacity:6 a person in an of&
cial capacity," and entities, such as a school district."' In
reality these three classifications are really two, because anytime a person is sued in an official capacity, the plaintiff is
actually suing the entity that person represents. However, the
courts use all three classifications, so they will be considered
separately.
First, any individual sued in an individual capacity is classified as a "person7'under section 1983, regardless of whether
that individual is a state or local offi~ial.~'
There is no complex formula for finding that an individual is a "person" under
section 1983.
Second, if a person is sued in an official capacity, the classification as a "person" depends upon whether the official is a
state official. A state official cannot be sued for damages in an
official capacity because it would be the same as suing the
state. Under Will v. Michigan Department of State Police:'
the state is not a "person" and cannot be sued for damages
under section 1983. An injured party is limited to seeking prospective injunctive relief from the state and monetary relief
ancillary to injunctive relief.51 Conversely, if a municipal (not
state) employee is sued in an official capacity, it is the municipality that is actually being sued and is liable for general damages under M0ne11.~~
This is because a municipality does not
receive protection under the Eleventh A~nendment.~~
Third, municipal liability and state non-liability under
section 1983 is particularly important to entities like schools
and school districts. Schools can be arms either of the state or
46. This could be a teacher, a principal, a school employee, or a school board
member.
47. Suing a person in his official capacity is the same as suing the government agency that he represents. Thus, if a principal is sued in his or her official
capacity, it is the same as naming the school district as a defendant.
48. See, e.g., Ambus v. Granite Bd. of Educ., 975 F.2d 1555 (10th Cir. 1992).
49. See, e.g., Monroe v. Pape, 365 US. 167, 187 (1961), overruled in part by
Monell v. Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). This person is rarely the
focus of a $ 1983 claim because usually she does not have deep pockets.
50. 491 US. 58, 68-69 (1989).
51. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 US. 159, 167 11.14, 169 ~ . 1 7 - 1 8(1985).
52. Monell v. Dept. of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978); see also Will,
491 U.S. at 68-69.
53. See Monell, 436 US. at 690 n.54.
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of municipaIities depending upon the court's interpretation of
the specific state law.54 If the school is held to be an arm of
the state, the analysis stops there, and the school is protected
from section 1983 liability under the Eleventh Amend~nent.~~
However, most schools are not classified as arms of the state
and are therefore subject t o damages under section 1983 as
persons.56

B. How Extensive is the Term "Under Color of law?"
The term "under color of law" had a limited reach in the
early section 1983 cases.57Traditionally, only acts committed
by state officers in performance of their official duties came
54. Compare Ambus v. Granite Bd. of Educ., 975 F.2d 1555 (10th Cir. 1992)
(finding that a school is not an arm of the state) with Martinez v. Board of Educ.,
748 F.2d 1393 (10th Cir. 1984) (finding that a school is an arm of the state). Most
cases have found that school districts are persons. To reach this conclusion, a court
focuses on how much control the state has over the school districts. For example,
New Mexico's Constitution provides the state with significant management control
over schools. See Ambus, 975 F.2d at 1561-62. In contrast, Utah's local school districts have more control-at least according t o the court--so they are ostensibly not
an arm of the state.
Most jurisdictions have held that a school district is not an arm of the state.
In such jurisdictions, the schools are potentially liable under $ 1983. This liability
was derived from the analysis in Mt. Healthy City School District Board of Education v. Doyle, which denied a school district Eleventh Amendment immunity since
it was not an arm of the state. 429 U.S. 274 (1977). Although Mt. Healthy was an
Eleventh Amendment immunity case-not a 5 1983 case-its analysis has been
applied to school districts in the post-Monell era. Most courts have found that
school districts are not arms of the state and thus potentially liable under $ 1983.
See, e.g., Ambus, 975 F.2d 1555 (holding a school district was not an arm of the
state in Utah); Rosa R. v. Comelly, 889 F.2d 435 (2d Cir. 1989) (holding that a
school district was not an arm of the state in Co~ecticut),cert. denied, 496 U.S.
941 (1990); Fay v. South Colonie Cent. Sch. Dist., 802 F.2d 21 (2d Cir. 1986)
(holding a school district was not an arm of the state in New York); Minton v.
Saint Bernard Parish Sch. Bd., 803 F.2d 129 (5th Cir. 1986) (holding that a school
district was not an arm of the state in Louisiana); Travelers Indem. Co. v. School
Bd. of Dade County, 666 F.2d 505 (11th Cir. 1982) (holding a school district was
not an arm of the state in Florida), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 834 (1982). But see Martinez v. Board of Educ. of Taos Mun. Sch. Dist., 748 F.2d 1393 (10th Cir. 1984)
(holding that the New Mexico schools are an arm of the state).
55. The idea of the Eleventh Amendment is that citizens cannot bring suit
against their own state in federal court unless Congress specifically disallowed
Eleventh Amendment protection, which it did not do for 5 1983. See Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S.58, 67 (1989).
Whether a particular entity is a municipality or an arm of the state is a question infrequently discussed in $ 1983 literature because it rarely arises outside the
school district context.
56. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
57. Eric H. Zagrans, 'Under Color of" What Law: A Reconstructed Model of
Section 1983 LiabiZity, 71 VA. L. REV.499, 499-500 (1985).
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within the scope of section 1983." However, Monroe v. Pape
rejected this narrow construction of "under color of law."5g
Monroe expanded the interpretation to include not only acts
under legitimate law, but also the "[m]isuse of power, possessed
by virtue of state law and made possible only because the
wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law, is action
taken 'under color of' state law.'60
Although scholars currently debate the expanded view held
in Monroe:' the expanded view is the current status of the
law. Thus, individuals and entities such as school districts,
which are not arms of the state, can be held liable for misuse of
power. For example, in Doe v. Taylor Independent School DistriCt,'j2a school teacher had consensual sexual relations with a
minor. Such conduct was not sanctioned by the school and
contravened the state's statutory rape law. However, the teacher took full advantage of his position as teacher and coach to
seduce the student, and thus he acted under color of law.63
58. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 184-85 (1961), overruled in part by Monell
v. Dep't of Social Servs., 436 US. 658 (1978).
59. Id.
60. Id. (quoting United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941)); see also
Susan B . Shoemaker, D.T. v. Independent School Distrid: Limiting Liability Under
42 U.S.C. $ 1983, 24 URB. L. 393, 393-94 (1992) (discussing "under color of law" as
developed in various supreme court cases including United States v. Classic).
61. Compare Zagrans, supra note 57 with Steven L. Winter, The Meaning of
"Under Color Of" Law, 91 MICH. L. REV. 323 (1992).
Zagrans argues that § 1983 should be limited to state-authorized deprivation.
Zagrans, supra note 57, at 589. Such a limitation more accurately reflects the
"intent and understanding of the enacting Congress." Id. Further, this approach
would be simpler and eliminate the need for judicially created makeshift rules to
fill in gaps. Id. Finally, the limitation should relieve the Court's impulse to "pare
away substantive constitutional rights as a means of limiting the statute's broad
scope." Id.
Winter rejects the Zagrans model and interpretation both historically and as a
matter of statutory construction. Winter, supra a t 325-27. Winter claims that when
an ador is clothed with the appearance of official authority, the ador carries more
weight and can consequently do more harm. Id. at 417-18. For example, if a police
officer accuses a person of shoplifting, the accusation carries more weight than a
similar accusation by a private citizen. Id. Winter's approach is best characterized
by the following quote from William Penn: "Every Oppression against Law, by
Colour of any usurped Authority, is a Kind of Destruction, and it is the worst
Oppression that is done by Colour of Justice." Id. at 418 (quoting 1 A COLLECTION
OF THE WORKSOF WILLIAM PENN 27 (1726)).
62. 15 F.3d 443, 447-48 (5th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 70 (1994).
63. Id. at 452 n.4. The court listed some of the factors that showed the
teacher acted "under color of" state law. He required Doe to do little or no homework. Id. He spoke to another teacher about raising Doe's grades. The teacher was
also Doe's basketball coach. Id. His first inappropriate physical contact commenced
after a basketball game. Id. The teacher used his access to school facilities such as
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Thus, the "under color of law" requirement was met when a
teacher acted by virtue of his position and not his actual authority.
However, not all acts by teachers are under color of state
law. In D.T. v. Independent School District No. 16,64a f&hgrade teacher and boys' basketball coach sexually molested
some of his players while they were raising money to attend a
summer basketball camp. The court held that the camp and
fundraising were not school programs, but voluntary communit y a ~ t i v i t i e sSince
. ~ ~ the teacher was apparently acting outside
his official role as teacher and coach in running the summer
activity, he did not act "under color of law."
Although the court in Doe focused on the differences between Doe and D.T.,B6 analyzing the similarity of the courts'
approaches helps t o better understand the phrase "under color
of law" in the school context. Both courts focused on whether
the teacherlcoach was able t o take advantage of these children
because of his teacher status." The question of teacher status
in the "under color of law" context is fact specific. For example,
D.T. would likely have come out the other way if the teacher
had molested the students on the school grounds or after a
school-sponsored activity.
Although the teacher-student relationship discussed above
is a commonly litigated area for the phrase "under color of
law," there are many other areas in which school districts,
administrators, or teachers may be held liable under section
1983. Other commonly litigated areas under section 1983 include wrongful dismissals68(conflicts between employees and

a lab room adjoining his classroom and the fieldhouse to engage in inappropriate
sexual contact with Doe. Id. These factors illustrate how the teacherlcoach took
advantage of his position t o seduce Doe.
64. 894 F.2d 1176, 1182-85 (10th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 879 (1990).
Three players and the coach traveled to Sands Springs and Tulsa, Oklahoma, to
sell candy in order to raise money for summer camp. Id. at 1183. The coach had
the parents' permission to travel to these locations and spend one night. Id. at
1184. During this trip, the coach sexually abused each of the players. Id.
65. Id. at 1186-92; see also Doe, 15 F.3d at 452 n.4 (noting factual dserences
between Doe and D.T.).
66. Doe, 15 F.3d at 452 n.4 (noting factual differences between Doe and D.T.).
67. See D.T. v. Independent Sch. Dist. No. 16, 894 F.2d 1176, 1186-92 (10th
Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 879 (1990); Doe v. Taylor Indep. Sch. Dist., 15
F.3d at 451-54, cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 70 (1994).
68. See, e.g., Maestas v. Board of Educ. of Mora Indep. Sch. Dist., 749 F.2d
591 (10th Cir. 1984) (former assistant superintendent and former district bookkeeper brought suit under 8 1983 for failure to rehire when they did not make contri-
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the administration or school board), limitations on free expression (conflicts between students or employees and the administration or school board):' and student discipline (conflicts between students and the admini~tration).'~
In the peer abuse context, "under color of law" is a much
more difficult issue. The actual deprivation is caused by a
peer-a private third party-not the school or one of its employees. The injured party must argue that the school created
the hostile environment and refused t o try to stop the abuse
after it was reported. This indirect link to the school causes one
to wonder where the threshold for causation lies.

C. What is the Threshold for Causation under Section 1983.2
In City of Canton v. Harris,'l the Court reiterated the importance of causation in section 1983 claims. The Court held
that the "first inquiry in any case alleging municipal liability
under [section] 1983 is the question whether there is a direct
causal link between a municipal policy or custom and the alleged constitutional deprivati~n."'~In the case of peer violence
at school, this may be difficult to show since the deprivation is
caused by a party other than the school or one of its officials.
To compound this causation problem, the Supreme Court has

butions to the school board chairman's campaign); Martinez v. Board of Educ. of
Taos Mun. Sch. Dist., 748 F.2d 1393, 1394 (10th Cir. 1984) (former superintendent
brought suit for wrongful termination under $ 1983 claiming he was terminated
"because of his 'real or imagined' activities in [a] school board election"); Blackburn
v. Floyd County Bd. of Educ., 749 F. Supp. 159 (E.D. Ky. 1990) (teacher brought $
1983 action claiming wrongful dismissal when she exercised her First Amendment
rights); Martinez v. Board of Educ., 724 F. Supp. 857 (D.Utah 1989) (former high
school coach brought a $ 1983 action claiming she was wrongfully terminated as
an assistant basketball and volleyball coach).
69. See, e.g., Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986) (student claimed under $ 1983 that his right to free expression was denied when the
student was disciplined for using a sexual metaphor during an assembly); Tinker v.
Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (students claimed
under 4 1983 that their right to free expression was denied when the school district would not permit them to wear black arm bands protesting the Vietnam war).
70. See, e.g., Bethel, 478 U.S. 675 (1986) (student claimed right to free expression was denied under $ 1983 when the student was disciplined for using a
sexual metaphor during an assembly); Jefferson v. Ysleta Indep. Sch. Dist., 817
F.2d 303 (5th Cir. 1987) (student claimed teacher violated his rights under $ 1983
when the teacher lashed the second-grade student to a chair for the better part of
two days).
71. 489 U.S. 378, 385-92 (1989).
72. Id. at 385.
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held that the government has no affirmative duty to protect its
citizens from private actors.73
While these obstacles are difficult, they are not insurmountable. Such obstacles may be overcome by showing a special relationship and deliberate indifferen~e.~~
Some commentators argue that the vulnerability of the student and mandatory attendance laws create a special relationship between the
school and its students.75Possible bases for special relationships will be further discussed in part 111.
In addition to having a special relationship with a student,
the school must also act with deliberate indifference that deprives a student of some federal right.76For example, inadequately training teachers could be a policy of deliberate indifference if the inadequacy was so obvious that it would likely
lead t o constitutional deprivations in the classroom.77 Thus,
the school's action or inaction ultimately leads to a student's
deprivation, and not just any deprivation, but a deprivation of
a federal or constitutional right.

D. What Constitutes a Deprivation of a Constitutional Right?
Section 1983 cannot be claimed for a general injury; section
1983 is limited to deprivations of federal or constitutional
rights. For example, in the teacher disciplinary context, a right
would probably arise under the Fourteenth Amendment as a
deprivation of either a liberty interest7' or a property intere ~ t . In
? ~the case of physical injuries caused by another student, a student would probably claim a violation of bodily integrity.'' It is important for the claimant to distinguish be73. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 US. 189, 191
(1989).
74. Adam M. Greenfield, Note, Annie Get Your Gun Cause Help Ain't Comin':
The Need for Constitutional Protection from Peer Abuse in Public Schools, 43 DUKE
L.J. 588, 615-18 (1993) (citing Leslie Ansely, Many Teens Feel Unsafe in School,
USA TODAY, Aug. 13, 1993, a t 1A).
75. Id. at 601-14.
76. See City of Canton, 489 US. at 388.
77. See id. For an example of conduct that constitutes deliberate inMerence,
see Doe v. Taylor I d e p . Sch. Dkt., 15 F.3d 443 (5th Cir. 1994) (remanding to see
if the principal's failure to take corrective action against a teacher rose to the level
of deliberate indifference), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 70 (1994).
78. The liberty interest can take the form of a violation of the teacher's First
Amendment rights to speech or harm to the teacher's reputation.
79. If the dismissed teacher had an expectation of continued employment, the
dismissal deprives the teacher of a property interest. See, e.g., Ambus v. Granite
Bd. of Educ., 975 F.2d 1555 (10th Cir. 1992).
80. See, e.g., Doe v. Taylor Indep. Sch. Dist., 15 F.3d 443, 450-52 (5th Cir.
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tween claiming tortious conduct and constitutional or federal
depri~ation;~'
if the claimant fails to structure the claim as a
federal or constitutional deprivation, the case will be dis111. A SCHOOL'S
IJABILITY FOR PEER ABUSE UNDER
SECTION
1983

Public schools have become a place where violence and
In a recent poll, one
sexual harassment are ~ornmonplace.~~
third of the students polled felt unsafe at school." Most students knew someone who had brought a weapon t o school.85
Fifty percent said they knew someone who had switched
schools t o feel safer? Sexual harassment is commonplace.
Eighty-five percent of girls and seventy-six percent of boys in a
AAUW survey reported "unwanted and unwelcome sexual behavior [at school] that interferes with their lives."87 With all

1994) (although it was a teacher, not a student, that violated Doe's bodily integrity, the court's analysis substantiates bodily integrity claims under 8 1983), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 70 (1994). In a recent Supreme Court opinion regarding 8 1983,
the Court in dicta recognized bodily integrity as a substantive due process right.
See Albright v. Oliver, 114 S. Ct. 807, 812 (1994) (Rehnquist, J., joined by
07Connor, Scalia and Ginsburg, JJ.).
81. Both torts and constitutional deprivations can arise h m the same set of
facts.
82. See, e.g., Seamons v. Snow, 864 F. Supp. 1111, 1119-22 @. Utah 1994).
83. Graham v. Independent Sch. Dist. No. 1-89, 22 F.3d 991, 992-93 (10th
Cir. 1994).
84. Greenfield, supra note 74, at 589.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Karen M. Davis, Reading, Writing, and Sexual Harassment: Finding a
Constitutional Remedy When Schools Fail to Address Peer Abuse, 69 IND.L.J. 1123,
ASSOCIATION
OF UNIVERS~IY
WOMEN EDUCATIONAL
1124 (citing THE AMERICAN
FOUNDATION,HOSTILEHALLWAYS:THE AAUW SURVEYON SEXUALHARASSMENTIN
AMI?,RICA7SSCHOOLS 7 (June 1993)).
Sexual harassment may not be actionable under 8 1983. Section 1983 requires
a deprivation of a constitutional or federal right. Verbal sexual harassment, though
offensive, may not qualify under 8 1983. Scholars are calling for sexual harassment
claims in schools to be actionable under Title IX,which "was intended to discourage discrimination on the basis of sex in educational programs." Monica L. Sherer,
Comment, No Longer Just Child's Play: S c h d Liability Under Title LX for Peer
S d Harassment, 141 U. PA. L. REV.2119, 2123 (1993); cf. Gail Sorenson, Peer
Sexual Hamssment: Remedies and Guidelines Under Fedeml Law, 92 ED. LAWREP.
1, 1-5 (1994). "Because judicial actions under section 1983 are extremely complex
and because the Supreme Court has been reluctant to extend liability under Section 1983, students have had remarkably little success with such claims." Id. at 8
(citing as examples DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S.
189 (1989) (imposing no afbmative constitutional duty to protect individuals from
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these problems, some people have sought relief under section
1983. However, the courts have- been reluctant t o use section
1983 as a means for remedying the problems in our public
One reason for this reluctance comes from the Supreme Court, which held in DeShaney that the state has no
af'firmative duty to protect individuals from private actors.

A. The Court's Analysis in DeShaney
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist conceded
that "[tlhe facts of [DeShaney u. Winnebago] are undeniably
tragic."89 Joshua DeShaney was living with his father, whose
second marriage had just recently ended in divorce.90The second wife of Joshua's father complained t o police at the time of
The
' Winnebago
their divorce that Joshua was being a b ~ s e d . ~
County Department of Social Services (DSS) interviewed the
father, but he denied the accusation^.^^ Later, Joshua was admitted to a local hospital with multiple bruises and abras i o n ~ The
. ~ ~ examining physician suspected child abuse and
notified DSS. A "Child Protection Team" reviewed Joshua's
case but found there was insufficient evidence to remove Joshua from his father's custody?4 The team did, however, take
several other actions to protect Joshua. His father had t o attend counseling and Joshua had to attend a preschool proIn November 1983, a month later, Joshua was again
treated for suspicious injuries.g6For the next few months a
private actors) and Dorothy J. v. Little Rock Sch. Dist., 7 F.3d 729 (8th Cir. 1993)
(finding "no constitutiona1 duty to protect mentally retarded boy from assault and
rape by peer with history of assaultive behavior; school attendance does not create
special custodial relationship")). However, if the sexual harassment includes physical touching, the student may be able to bring an action under 9 1983. See, e.g.,
Spivey v. Elliott, 29 F.3d 1522 (11th Cir. 1994) (holding that a "special relationship
existing between student and state imposed duty on state to protect [the] student
from sexual assault by [a] classmate").
88. See, e.g., cases cited infizc note 116. But see Pagano v. Massapequa Pub.
Sch., 714 F. Supp. 641 (E.D.N.Y. 1989).
89. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Sews., 489 U.S. 189, 191
(1989).
90. Id.
91. The second wife was not Joshua's natural mother. Id. at 192.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. The "Child Protection Team" consisted of a pediatrician, a child psychologist, a police detective, the county's lawyer, several DSS caseworkers, and various
hospital personnel. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
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caseworker visited Joshua monthly; she carefully recorded that
Joshua was not in preschool and had suspicious physical injuries?? On two occasions, the caseworker was not allowed t o
see Joshua because he was "too ill."98 Sadly, in March 1984,
Joshua's father beat him so severely that he suffered permanent brain damage and will likely live the rest of his life instiJoshua's
father was convicted of child
tutionali~ed.~
~
abuse.loo
Joshua's natural mother brought a section 1983 claim
against DSS and various individual employees for depriving
Joshua of his liberty interest under the Fourteenth
Amendment.'" Joshua's mother claimed his liberty interest
was deprived because DSS failed t o intervene and protect him
when they knew of the danger he was i d o 2The district court
granted DSS's motion for summary judgment, which the Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit and the Supreme Court affirmed.lo'
The Supreme Court found "no affirmative right t o governmental aid, even where such aid may be necessary to secure
life, liberty, or property interests of which the government itself
may not deprive the individual."'" The purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was t o protect individuals from the state,
not from each other.lo5 The Amendment was phrased as a
limitation on the state's power t o act, "not as a guarantee of
certain minimal levels of safety and security."106
The Court's underlying policy consideration was twofold.
First, the Court recognized that if DSS had acted too soon, it
would likely have been attacked by Joshua's father under the
Due Process ~ 1 a u s e . Second,
l~~
the state, through its legislative process, should decide which system of liability is best t o
place upon the state and its offi~ers.''~If the state wants
DSS to be liable, the state can create such a system under tort

97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 192-93.
at 193.

at 193-94.
at 196.
at 195.
at 203.
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law through its normal legislative process.109 "They should
not have [such liability] thrust upon them by this Court's expansion of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."' lo
However, the Court did recognize two exceptions to its
holding of no afliirmative duty. First, the state creates a special
relationship for itself when a person is incarcerated or institutionalized.'" Such individuals have been committed involuntarily and-by reason of their liberty deprivation-are unable
to care for themselves.'" Second, the court implied in footnote nine that a n affirmative duty to protect may arise in "a
situation sufficiently analogous to incarceration or institutionali~ation."~'~
For example, if the state puts a child "in a foster
home operated by the state's agent," the state might be liable if
the foster home is worse than the home from which the child
was removed."' However, since these facts were not before
the Court, this exception is dicta only.115

B. Applying DeShaney to the Public School Context
Although DeShaney was a child welfare case, the opinion's
rules and exceptions have become the source of controversy in
the public school context. Courts have been reluctant to extend
the special relationship doctrine to public schools. The six circuits that have addressed the issue have held that schools have
no special relationship with their student^.'^^ However, many
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 198-199 (citing Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982); Estelle v.
Gamble, 492 U.S. 97 (1976)).
112. Id.
113. Id. at 201 n.9.
114. Id. This situation is often referred to as the "snake-pit" exception because
the state action created a worse environment for the child. See Karen M. Blum,
DeShaney: Custody, Creation of Danger, and Culpability, 27 LOY. L.A. L. REV.435
(1994); Julie Shapiro, Snake Pits and Unseen Actors: Constitutional Liability for
Indirect Harm, 62 CIN. L. REV. 883 (1994).
115. DeSbney, 489 U.S. at 201 n.9.
116. See, e.g., Leffall v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 28 F.3d 521, 528-29 (5th Cir.
1994) (holding the school had no ailinnative duty under § 1983 to protect a student injured by another student in the school parking lot after a nonmandatory
school dance); Graham v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 1-89, 22 F.3d 991, 992-93 (10th Cir.
1994) (holding no custodial relationship exists between school and student; thus,
the school district did not have an affirmative duty to protect students from another student even if school employees had received warnings that the other student
had threatened violence); Dorothy J. v. Little Rock Sch. Dist., 7 F.3d 729, 732 (8th
Cir. 1993) (no custodial relationship); Black v. Indiana Area Sch. Dist., 985 F.2d
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commentators are persuaded that the special relationship doctrine should extend to public schools.117Both sides have valid
arguments to support their position on the special relationship
issue.

1. The case for finding a special relationship in pub1 ic schools

a. Arguments from the courts in favor of a special relationship. Less than four months after DeShaney was decided,
Pagano v. Massapequa extended the special relationship doctrine to public s~hools."~
The analysis in Pagano is very limited. The court based its opinion on the frequency of the
abuse.llg According t o the court, a single act of negligence
does not form a basis for a civil rights action.120However, the

707, 713-14 (3rd Cir. 1993) (no custodial relationship); J.O. v. Alton Community
Unit Sch. Dist. 11, 909 F.2d 267, 272 (7th Cir. 1990); Russell v. Fannin County
Sch. Dist., 784 F. Supp. 1576, 1581-83 (N.D. Ga. 1992), a r d without opinion, 981
F.2d 1263 (llth Cir. 1992); cf. Michael Gilbert, Keeping the Door Open: A Middle
Ground on the Question of Mzrmative Duty in the Public Schools, 142 U. PA. L.
REV. 471, 481 11.45 (1993) (listing other cases holding no custodial relationship).
But see Pagano v. Massapequa Pub. Sch., 714 F. Supp. 641 (E.D.N.Y. 1989); cf.
Doe v. Taylor Indep. Sch. Dist., 975 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1992) (custodial relationship
undecided), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1066, reh'g granted, 987 F.2d 231 (5th Cir.
1993), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, and remanded, 15 F.3d 443 (5th Cir. 1994) (this
final decision never discussed the special or custodial relationship theory, but decided the issue on the basis of the principal's "deliberate indifference" to the cond u d of the teacher, a state actor, who caused the deprivation), cert. denied, 115 S.
Ct. 70 (1994); Walton v. Alexander, 20 F.3d 1350 (5th Cir. 1994) (holding a special
relationship existed between a deaf student and the superintendent); Spivey v.
Elliott, 29 F.3d 1522 ( l l t h Cir. 1994) (the court distinguishes this case from Russell v. Fannin County School District and many of the other cases above because
the student was a residential student and could not go home at the end of the
day).
117. See, e.g., Greenfield, supra note 74, at 623-24; Steven F. Huefner, M r mative Duties in the Public Schools After DeShaney, 90 COLUM.L. REV. 1940, 1972
(1990); Blum, supra note 114, at 479; see also Gilbert, supra note 116, at 509
(arguing for the proposition that an affirmative duty should be applied in some
contexts but not all). But see Stephen Faberman, Note, The Lessons of DeShaney:
Special Relationships, Schools & the Fifih Circuit, 35 B.C. L. REV. 97 (1993) (arguing against affirmative obligation to protect students in public schools).
118. Pagano v. Massapequa Pub. Sch., 714 F. Supp. 641 (E.D.N.Y. 1989). Like
most other # 1983 claims in the public school cases, the issue arises in the context
of a summary judgment motion or a motion to dismiss. See, e.g., Doe v. Taylor
Indep. Sch. Dist., 975 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1066, reh'g
granted, 987 F.2d 231 (5th Cir. 1993), affd in part, rev'd in part, and remanded,
15 F.3d 443, 458 (5th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 70 (1994); Searnons v.
Snow, 864 F. Supp. 1111, 1114 (D.Utah 1994) (motion to dismiss).
119. Pagano, 714 F. Supp. at 642-43.
120. Id. at 643. This is not exactly accurate. A single act of negligence may
rise to the level of deliberate indifference if the plaintiff can show that the single
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student in this case alleged seventeen separate incidents of
verbal and physical abuse.lzl The court held that allowing
seventeen acts could amount t o deliberate indifference on the
part of the
Pagano and cases decided by other district courts in the
Second Circuit are the only cases to find a special relationship
between public schools and their students. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has not yet opined on the issue.
Although it was thought that the Fifth Circuit had split with
the other circuit courts by finding a special relationship between schools and students, that assumption was subsequently
denied by the Fifth Circuit.lB To date, no circuit court has
act was a policy made by either a legislative body (school board) or a person with
final decision-making authority (principal or superintendent). This would probably
be a rare event requiring, for example, a school board to pass a motion allowing
guns at show and tell.
121. Id. at 643.
122. Id.
123. Compare Gilbert, supra note 116, at 489-93 with Leffall v. Dallas Indep.
Sch. Dist., 28 F.3d 521, 528-29 (5th Cir. 1994). The thought at the time of the
Gilbert comment was that the Fif'th Circuit Court of Appeals had adopted the
Pagano approach in Doe v. Taylor Independent School District. Gilbert, supra note
116, at 489 n.90 (citing Doe v. Taylor Ind. Sch. Dist., 975 F.2d 137 (5th Cir.
1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1066, reh'g granted, (5th Cir. 1993)). Subsequent to
the Gilbert comment, the Fifth Circuit opined on the rehearing of Doe v. Taylor
Independent School District. See Doe v. Taylor Indep. Sch. Dist., 15 F.3d 443 (5th
Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 70 (1994). The court avoided the special relationship issue and denied the principal's motion for summary judgment under the
deliberate indifference standard. Id. at 458; cf. Leffall, 28 F.3d at 528-29 ('We did
not address the question of whether a special relationship exists in an ordinary
public school setting in our en banc decision in Doe v. Taylor Indep. Sch. Dist.").
L.effall clarified that Doe v. Taylor Independent School District did not address
the special relationship issue. However, Leffall did not conclusively establish the
Fifth Circuit's position on special relationships. The court held that there was no
special relationship with a student who was killed by random gunfire in a parking
lot after a school dance. Id. at 526-29. The court buttressed its holding by citing
that its "sister circuits" had concluded that no special relationship existed between
a school and a student. Id. at 528 (citing the Third, Seventh, Eighth, and Tenth
Circuits). However, the court left the door open for the possibility of a special
relationship being established in the future. The court focused its fmding of no
special relationship on the student's attendance at a voluntary after-school dance
as opposed to the regular school day attendance. Id. at 529. Because the student
was not compelled to go to the dance, the court stated:
W]e need not go so far as have some of our sister circuits and conclude
that no special relationship can ever exist between an ordinary public
school district and its students; we conclude only that no such relationship exists during a school-sponsored dance held outside of the time during which students are required to attend school for non-voluntary activities.
Id. Thus, the position of the Fifth Circuit is simply uncertain at this time.
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found a special relationship in public schools.'24
b. Arguments from commentators in favor of a special
relationship. Most commentators argue that students should be
able to bring section 1983 actions for deprivations caused by
other students.'" Although the general rule is that the government has no affirmative duty t o protect students from their
peers, commentators argue that schools should fall into the
special relationship exception under DeSh~ney.'~~
This argument is based on three theories: legal custody theory,
functional custody theory, and the snake-pit theory.
Under the legal custody theory, the government has a duty
to protect students under the doctrine of in loco parentis. This
authority is not voluntarily given by parents but is mandated
by state statute." States mandate this authority through
compulsory education laws and punitive actions against both
parents and students for truancy.'28 Thus, the laws mandate
that a school take custody of a student during the regular
school day. Because a school effectively has legal custody during the regular school day, it should also assume the responsibility associated with its custody.
Even if a school does not have legal custody, commentators
argue that a school has functional custody of a student, which
is an indicia of a special relati~nship.''~Rather than looking
at the school's legal authority, the functional custody theory
looks at the particular set of circumstances to find a special
relationship, creating an affirmative duty.'" The focus is on
factors such as control, dependency, and vulnerability.'3'
"Schools may be said t o have functional custody of students
because they restrict students' ability t o protect themselves as
well as their parents' ability to intercede on their behalf."'"

124. Wright v. Lovin, 32 F.3d 538, 540 (11th Cir. 1994); see cases cited supra
note 116 and accompanying text.
125. See commentators cited supra note 117.
126. Id.
127. See, e.g., UTAHCODE ANN. § 53A-11-101 (1994) (requiring students to
attend school); see also Greenfield, supra note 74, at 604-05.
128. See, e.g., UTAHCODEANN. § 53A-11-103 (1994) (empowering local board's
to issue truancy citations and enforce school attendance).
129. See Blum, supra note 114, at 445-57; Greenfield, supra note 74, at 60914; Huefner, supra note 117, at 1966-69.
130. Compare Blum, supra note 114, at 445-57 with Greenfield, supra note 74,
at 609-14 and Huefner, supra note 117, at 1966-69.
131. Greenfield, supra note 74, at 609; Hueher, supra note 117, at 1957.
132. Greenfield, supra note 74, at 609.
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In finding a special relationship under functional custody,
courts should look to the nature of the student-state
relationship? Liability should arise in the school context because the state, by limiting a victim's freedom or taking some
responsibility for his or her care, has increased the victim's
dependence on the state's protection? This increased dependence creates an aflirmative duty for the school.
The snake-pit theory, which stems from DeShaney's footnote nine,'% is another theory used to create a special relationship. Under this theory, if a student is placed in a more
dangerous situation by the state, the state assumes an affirmative duty and should be liable for any increase in harm.ls6
The affirmative duty arises because the state creates and controls the environment where the student is harmed.13' However, this theory leaves many policy questions unanswered. For
example, was the child worse off a t school than he or she would
have been playing in the neighborhood at home? A child who is
shot at school may have been less likely t o be shot at school
than in the neighborhood playground. How do we gauge
whether a child is worse off? If a student in Burlington, Wyoming, is less likely t o be shot at home, while a student in East
Los Angeles is more likely to be shot at home, does an equal
protection problem arise if one student can recover damages
while the other cannot?
c. Underlying policy reasons in favor of a special relationship. The policy reasons for creating a special relationship
between students and schools are apparent in both academic
discussion and the cases. Students who are physically or sexually assaulted at school have no recourse against the establishment that may have permitted or even fostered the environment that gave rise t o the deprivation. Granted, the injured
party has a right against the tortfeasor, but this does little to
remedy an environment that threatens future deprivations.

133. Huefner, supra note 117, at 1957.
134. Id.
135. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 201
n.9 (1989).
136. Id.
137. Huefner, supra note 117, at 1968. In DeSltaney, the abusive environment
was created by Joshua's father, not the government agency. However, if the agency
had taken Joshua out of his father's home and put him in a foster home that was
an even worse environment, the agency would be liable for the increased risk of
harm. See DeShuney, 489 U.S. at 201 n.9.
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Additionally, it is unlikely that the state will provide a
cause of action for the injured party under state tort law?
Public perception, whether accurate or not, is that expanding
school liability will increase the cost of schools. Schools will either have to raise revenues or cut programs. Either move will
likely be controversial and unpopular.
Furthermore, historically this is precisely the type of harm
that section 1983 was intended t o prevent-a deprivation of
federal rights due to local officials' reluctance or inability t o
enforce the law.lsg If the state is reluctant or unable, it is the
federal government's duty to step in and protect such constitutional and federal rights.
Finally, in contrast t o public perception, creating a special
relationship will not produce a myriad of large civil awards
against the schools.140A special relationship simply helps the
injured party satisfy the "under color of law" prong. Causation
still must be established by proving that the school official or
district was deliberately indifferent.141 This standard is higher than simple negligence and places a heavy burden on the injured student.142Such a standard would limit successful section 1983 claims to only the most egregious cases.

138. In Utah, for example, the Governmental Immunity A d prevents an injured party from suing the school district for any injury arising out of an assault
or battery. UTAH CODEANN. 5 63-30-10 (1993). The exception to this is if the
school district or its officers acted with fraud or malice. UTAHCODEANN. 5 63-304 (1993). However, this is no help for two reasons. First, it is unlikely that a
school official or board will have acted with malice towards a student injured by
another student. Their conduct will likely be categorized as negligent or grossly
negligent, which does not rise to the level of malice. Second, even if a teacher
intentionally injured or caused a student to be injured, the school district still may
not be liable. Such conduct by a teacher would likely be outside the scope of employment and, thus, the school district may not be liable.
139. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 171 (1961), overruled in part by
Monell v. Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). But, there may be a difference between the constitutional right sought to be upheld-most likely violation of
bodily integrity-and assault and battery, which is covered under traditional state
tort law. A question arises as to whether the courts want to effectively override
state governmental immunity statutes or whether such decisions should be left to
legislative bodies. See DeShaney, 489 U.S.at 203.
140. Huefner, supra note 117, at 1961-62; Susanna M. Kim, Comment, Section
1983 Liability in the Public Schools After Deshaney: The "Special Relationship" Betureen School and Student, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1101, 1136 (1994).
141. City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989); Greenfield, supra note
74, at 614-23.
142. It would be interesting to compare the malice standard under the governmental immunity laws with the deliberate indifference standard under § 1983.
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In summary, there are strong public policy reasons to support finding a special relationship in public schools. However,
these policy reasons must be weighed against and compared to
other policy reasons that support finding no special relationship as discussed be10w.l~~

The case against finding a special relationship in public
schools
a. The circuit courts have unanimously held no special
relationship in pu bl ie schools. Presently, six circuit courts of
appeal have faced the special relationship issue and all six
have found that no special relationship exists in the public
~ ~ facts of each case are different and
school ~ 0 n t e x t . lThe
each holding varies. To understand why no special relationship
has been found, it will be useN to compare the extreme
opinions and the commonalities of these cases.
The two cases that sit a t opposite extremes are Graham v.
Independent School District No. I-89l" and Leffall v. Dallas
In Graham, two students were
Independent School Distri~t.'~~
killed by peers on the school premise^.'^' The decedents'
mothers each brought section 1983 claims, arguing that the
school knew of the violent propensities of the aggressor student.14' Furthermore, the school's knowledge combined with
the quasi-custodial nature of school attend-ance satisfied the
DeShaney requirements.'" However, the court held that
"foreseeability cannot create an finnative duty to protect
when plaintiff remains unable to allege a custodial relationship."150The court went on to explain that "[ilnaction by the
state in the face of a known danger is not enough t o trigger the
obligation; according t o DeShaney the state must have limited
in some way the liberty of a citizen to act on his own be-

2.

143. Most commentators have taken the position that a special relationship
should be found. See, e.g., Greenfield, supra note 74; Huefner, supra note 117. In
taking such a position, very little attention has been given to the policy reasons
supporting those decisions not finding special relationships.
144. See cases cited supra note 116.
145. 22 F.3d 991 (10th Cir. 1994).
146. 28 F.3d 521 (5th Cir. 1994).
147. Graham, 22 F.3d at 993 (one student was shot and another was
stabbed-each mother brought suit). Both cases were dismissed when the court
granted the school's federal rule 126x6) motions. Id.
148. Id. at 994.
149. Id.
150. Id.
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half."15' This holding is the strongest position taken by any
circuit court against fmding an affirmative duty.
On the other end of the spectrum, the most lenient circuit
on the peer abuse issue was the Fifth Circuit in Leffall u. Dallas Independent School District? This case is factually distinguishable from Graham because the student's death took
place .after a school dance where attendance was not
required? Although factually distinguishable from Graham,
the Leffall opinion indicates that the court was unwilling t o go
as far as the Tenth Circuit in Graham.155Leffall went on to
say that the special relationship decision in "ordinary public
school" was left open for another day.'= The court hinted
that under the right factual circumstances, it might fmd a
special relationship. This somewhat indecisive Fifth Circuit
opinion represents the weakest stand against fmding a special
relationship.
In addition to the extreme positions of the circuits, it is
important t o focus on the commonalities that have lead the
courts to their holdings. For example, in opining on the special
relationship exception to a lack of an affirmative duty, the
circuits have distinguished schools from the classic incarceration or institutionalization scenarios of the DeShaney exception.
First, the school's custody does not deprive guardians of their
responsibility over the ~hildren.'~'Guardians are still the primary care providers for children.'" Children are only a t

151. Id. at 995 (quoting Reed v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1122, 1125 (7th Cir. 1993),
cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 389 (1993)).
152. However, even the Tenth Circuit seems t o recognize the snake-pit exception. See Graham, 22 F.3d at 995 ("[Pllaintiffs cannot point to any affirmative actions by the defendants that created or increased the danger to the victims.") (emphasis added).
153. 28 F.3d 521 (5th Cir. 1994).
154. Id. at 529. If a special relationship exists because students are legally
compelled to attend school, the legal custody argument may fail if attendance is
voluntary. See supra part 1II.B.l.b.
155. After noting that the Tenth Circuit "has gone so far as to hold that a
t liable for a tort inflicted on a student by a private actor
school district c a ~ o be
during school hours even if its employees knew that the private actor had threatened the student and was present on school grounds," the Leffall court stated that
they "need not go so far as have some of our sister circuits and conclude that no
special relationship can ever exist between an ordinary public school district and
its students." Id. at 528-29 (emphasis added).
156. Id. at 528-29.
157. E.g., Dorothy J. v. Little Rock Sch. Dist., 7 F.3d 729, 732 (8th Cir. 1993);
J.O. v. Alton Community Unit Sch. Dist. 11, 909 F.2d 267, 272-73 (7th Cir. 1990).
158. Dorothy J., 7 F.3d at 732; J.O. u. Alton, 909 F.2d at 272-73.
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school for part of the day; the greater part of the day, they are
not in the custody of the school. Additionally, the courts have
narrowly read the special relationship exception:
[Wlhen the State by the affirmative exercise of its power so
restrains an individual's liberty that it renders him unable to
care for himself, and a t the same time fails to provide for his
basic human needs--e.g., food, clothing, shelter, medical care,
and reasonable safety-it transgresses the substantive limits
on state action set by the Eighth Amendment and the Due
Process C 1 a ~ s e . l ~ ~

Since the guardians of a public school student are still the
primary providers of food, clothing, and shelter, no affirmative
duty is assumed by the school.160
Second, students are not as severely restricted as involuntarily committed mental patients or prisoners.16' Although
there are some school restrictions and a mandatory attendance
policy, students are not so controlled that they are denied access to help.lB2Furthermore, parents may choose whether a
child's education will take place in public schools rather than in
the home, vocational-technical schools, or private schools.163
Even if guardians are limited financially, they still retain discretion t o withdraw their children.lg4
Besides the limited restrictions on the students and the
parents being the primary care providers, little else is used t o
justify the courts' position. Although there is some fluctuation
in the stricture of holdings of no special relationship, the unan-

159. Black v. Indiana Area Sch. Dist., 985 F.2d 707, 713 (3rd Cir. 1993)
(quoting DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 200
(1989)).
160. J.O. v. Nton, 909 F.2d at 272.
161. Id. ("The analogy of a school yard to a prison may be a popular one for
school-age children, but we c a ~ o recognize
t
constitutional duties on a child's lament .").
162. Black, 985 F.2d at 713; Russell v. Fannin County Sch. Dist., 784 F. Supp.
1576, 1582 W.D. Ga. 1992), afld without opinion, 981 F.2d 1263 ( l l t h Cir. 1992).
In Russell, the court stated: "The key concept is the exercise of dominion or restraint by the state. The state must somehow significantly limit an individual's
freedom or impair his ability to a d on his own before it can be constitutionally
required to care and provide for that person." Id. at 1582 (quoting Wideman v.
Shallowford Community Hosp., Inc., 826 F.2d 1030, 1035 ( l l t h Cir. 1987)) (emphasis added).
163. Black, 985 F.2d at 713.
164. Id. at 713-14. But see Greenfield, supm note 74, a t 607-08 (exercising this
right may be limited because of the economic restraints).
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swered question is whether courts have denied finding a special
relationship in public schools because it is a simple bright-line
test, which makes their job easy in a difficult area of the law,
or because of valid policy reasons.
b. Underlying policy reasons against a special relationship. Several policy reasons support the case against finding a
special relationship. First, legislative bodies should decide
whether liability should be imposed through the regular lawmaking process.'" If the state does not already have a tort
system that creates liability in public schools, the people of that
state can change the system.lB6 However, such a system
should not be forced upon them by the "Court's expansion of
A
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth A~nendment."'~~
constitutional wrong is significantly different than a tort?
Second, few people will be helped by creating liability through
fmding a special relationship. Commentators argue for the
need for section 1983 claims.16gHowever, to buffer the concern over large liabilities, they argue that the high threshold of
the deliberate indifference standard will allow only egregious
cases t o go t o trial. However, this reasoning is flawed. If deliberate indifference is such a high standard,'" very few plaintiffs will find relief under section 1983. Conversely, because
section 1983 also includes awards for attorneys' fees, lawyers
have a greater incentive t o sue under section 1983. Opening
the door a little more will encourage many unnecessary suits t o
burden the already overcrowded federal system.
Third, damage awards under section 1983 take money
away from our educational system. Blaming the school rather
than the student tortfeasors is no solution to violent behavior
in our schools. Damages simply reduce the already limited
funds available for public education.17'

165. See DeShaney v. W i ~ e b a g oCounty Dep't of Social Sews., 489 U.S. 189,
203 (1989).
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Leffall v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 28 F.3d 521, 532 (5th Cir. 1994) (citing
De Jesus Benavides v. Santos, 883 F.2d 385, 388 (5th Cir. 1989)).
169. Greenfield, supra note 74, at 609; Huefner, supra note 117, at 1957.
170. Hueher, supra note 117, at 1957.
171. The state created the educational process to satisfy the needs of the community. The state through the normal legislative process should also decide what
level of risk is appropriate in public schools. If corrective action is needed, the
state can take a variety of creative approaches to resolve the crisis in our schools.
The court has just one approach--damages, which takes h n d s away from our pub-
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Fourth, a court's action may force state legislative bodies to
react in ways that may not be beneficial for education. Although commentators argue that section 1983 claims will be
limited, state officials may believe that Pandora's box has been
opened and overreact. As discussed in part 1I.A. above, the
state cannot be sued under section 1983. The perceived
threat-not necessarily the realistic threat-of section 1983
liability may encourage a more centralized public educational
system.'72 This does nothing to help the injured parties and
reduces the flexibility of states to explore helpful alternative
educational policies.'"
Fifth, allowing students t o sue the school district for injuries caused by other students goes beyond Congress's intent in
enacting section 1983. Congress specifically rejected the
Sherman Amendment to the Civil Rights Act of 1871.'~~The
Sherman Amendment, which would have made municipalities
liable for any act committed within their boundaries, was rejected because of the tremendous burden that it would place on
m~nicipalities.'~~
Although Monell allowed municipal liability, it limited that liability to situations where an official policy
causes a n employee to violate another's constitutional
right^."^ Constitutional deprivations caused by other students

lic schools.
172. For example, the Utah legislature has considered the impact that 8 1983
claims will have on the state's educational system. MINUTESOF THE EDUCATION
OF THE UTAHLEGISLATURE
4-6 (April 27, 1994) (copy on file
INTERIMCOMMITTEE
with author) (discussing whether the state wanted schools to be liable under O
1983 or whether state legislative actions should be taken to protect public schools);
see abo MINUTESOF THE EDUCATION
INTERIMC O M ~ EOE
F THE UTAHLEGISLATURE 3-4 (May 18, 1994) (copy on file with author) (discussing 5 1983 liability for
public schools). Conversely, the fear of 8 1983 claims may motivate state and local
officials to legislate corrective action to help eliminate the problems in our public
schools; cf. MINUTES OF THE EDUCATION
INTERIMCOMMPITEE
OF THE UTAHLEGISLATURE 5 (April 27, 1994) (copy on file with author) (stating that school "districts
need to be accountable and a t the same time enjoy some aspects of immunity").
173. For example, Utah is currently experimenting with the Centennial School
Program. Part of the theory of centennial schools is increasing site-based decision
making, a move towards decentralization. Whether such policies are good or bad,
effective or ineffective is irrelevant. An overreaction by the state legislature to a
perceived threat may take away the opportunity to experiment and explore educational alternatives.
174. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 188-91 (1961), o v e d e d in part by
Monell v. Dep't of Social Sews., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
175. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 188-91; see supra part I.B.
176. Monell v. Dep't of Social Sews. of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 691-92 (1978).
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goes beyond the historical scope and intent of section 1983 as
explained in Monroe and Monell.'"
Sixth, ironically, broadly construing a special relationship
may discourage socially beneficial programs. For example, a
state may repeal the mandatory attendance statute in hopes of
avoiding liability under section 1983. Such a move may put
more children on the streets and lead to more injuries and
death. Granted this is an extreme example and unlikely to
happen, but the reality is that nobody knows how the states
will react if they feel threatened or ~verburdened."~Since
education and social service programs are self-imposed by the
states, such programs may be limited because of increased
liability or a perceived threat of increased liability. Judicial
activism sometimes creates more harm than good. Section 1983
will provide little relief for victims and has the propensity for
negative change in our educational system. Given the alternatives, the bright-line test used by the courts may not be so bad
after all.
c. The resident school exception. In contrast t o normal
public school cases, resident schools have a special relationship
with their students.179Only two circuit courts have addressed
this question, and both held that a special relationship existed?' Residential schools were distinguished from normal
public schools in four ways. First, the school has twenty-four
hour custody of the student.''' Second, the student in Walton
was a disabled student who lacked "basic communications
skills that a normal child would possess."182Third, the student was not free to leave when he was in the custody of the

177. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 188-91; Monell, 436 U.S. at 691-92.
178. For example, California is currently struggling with Proposition 187. This
proposition denies illegal immigrants access to state social services and education.
Although the Proposition may be held unconstitutional under Plyex, v. Doe, 457
U.S. 202 (1982), the issue illustrates the frustration of individuals and their overreaction. People are willing to do extreme things to avoid financial burdens.
179. See, e.g., Walton v. Alexander, 20 F.3d 1350 (5th. Cir. 1994) (residential
student at school for the deaf had a special relationship with the school, but the
superintendent was not liable under 5 1983 for sexual assault by another student
because the superintendent's conduct did not amount to deliberate indifference);
Spivey v. Elliott, 29 F.3d 1522 (11th Cir. 1994) (a residential student at a school
for the deaf had a special relationship with the school, but school officials were not
liable under 5 1983 for sexual assault by a classmate because their duty was not
clearly established at the time of the assault).
180. Walton, 20 F.3d a t 1355; Spivey, 29 F.3d at 1524.
181. Walton, 20 F.3d a t 1355; Spivey, 29 F.3d at 1525.
182. Walton, 20 F.3d a t 1355.
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scho01.'~ Finally, the state assumed responsibility for the
student's basic needs such as food, clothing,-and shelter.'"
These four factors clearly put the resident school cases
within the DeShaney Court's special relationship exception.
The school not only assumed the educational responsibilities,
but also the primary custodial responsibilities.'" The key factors seem to be twenty-four hour custody and control over basic
needs.'" Under such conditions, a special relationship was
created.18'

3. The middle ground to a special relationship in public
schools: bifurcating state actors fron other students
Section 1983 claims in which a teacher causes the deprivation are distinguishable from cases in which the deprivation is
caused by other students.18' The factual difference is twofold.
First, students are in a more vulnerable position vis-a-vis
school officials, since officials are looked upon as authority
figures.'* Second, school officials are state actors who act
under color of law.lgo Although the vulnerability argument
infers a special relationship,lg' the focus should be on the deprivation caused by a state actor. Under the state actor analysis, there is no need for a special relationship analysis to show

183. Id.
184. Spivey, 29 F.3d at 1525.
185. Id. at 1524.
186. Id. at 1524-25.
187. It is worth noting that both of these cases occurred in circuits that have
addressed special relationships in the non-residential school context. In Spivey, the
court carefully distinguished the residential school cases from day school cases,
stating that "it was still the children's parents who had ultimate control of their
basic needs." Spivey, 29 F.3d at 1525. Walton was also distinguished h m the
nonresidential schools, but in a later Fifth Circuit case. Leffall v. Dallas Indep.
Sch. Dist., 28 F.3d 521, 529 (5th Cir. 1994). Leffdl distinguished itself from Walton
for the following reasons: the school in question was "not a school for the disabled,
nor is it a boarding school with twenty-four hour custody of its students." Id. a t
529; cf. Spivey, 29 F.3d at 1524-25 (involving a deaf student under the twenty-four
hour care of a residential school).
188. See Leffall, 28 F.3d a t 528-29; Gilbert, supra note 116, at 502-09.
189. Gilbert, supra note 116, at 504.
190. Doe v. Taylor Indep. Sch. Dist., 15 F.3d 443, 452 n.4 (5th Cir. 1994), cert.
denied, 115 S. Ct. 70 (1994).
191. Leffall, 28 F.3d at 528-29 ("The special relationship doctrine is properly
invoked in cases involving harms inflicted by third parties, and it is not applicable
when it is the conduct of a state actor that has allegedly infringed a person's constitutional rights.").
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causation from the school because there is a state actor.lg2
The state actor's supervisor and the school district could be
held liable if they acted with deliberate indifference.lg3 This
approach allows section 1983 claims against school officials
without invoking the special relationship analysis. This analysis allows the court to avoid the quagmire of student inflicted
deprivations by using the bright-line test that there are no
special relationships.
IV. CONCLUSION
Section 1983 is complex as walking through a mine field:
one is uncertain where to step next. Although commentators do
not like the bright-line approach, they seem to oversimplifg the
impact of exposing schools to more liability. Even though
schools still have the deliberate indifference buffer, the expense
of simply defending suits could be enormous. Contrary to the
arguments of commentators, the circuits bright-line approach is
grounded in firm public policy. Historically, it avoids the affixmative duty concerns implicitly rejected by Congress in the
Sherman Amendments and expressly by the Court in
DeShaney. Practically, given the complexity of section 1983, it
is somewhat refreshing to see a bright-line test that facilitates
the judicial process and puts everyone on notice as to what
their rights are. Philosophically, states will be encouraged to
structure the educational system based on what will be effective to remedy violence in schools rather than how to avoid
potential liability.
As commentators admit, permitting a special relationship
i n public schools will only help the few who can overcome the
deliberate indifference threshold. In a n attempt to help the few,
constitutional rights are turning into nothing more than common torts while not even trying to catch the actual tortfeasor.
To avoid this problem, courts should continue the practice
of disallowing section 1983 claims against public schools for
peer abuse. If a remedy is needed, the cause of action should be
provided by state tort law through the legislative process. If the
state fails to provide relief, a party could bring a federal action
against the school for prospective injundive relief or lobby the
legislature to make desirable, constructive changes. Additional-

192. Id.
193. See, e.g., Doe, 15 F.3d at 456-58.
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ly, an action could be brought against the tortfeasor student.

But alas, the student does not have the deep pockets; and was
it not the school's deep pockets that prompted the action
against the school in the first place?

Robert L.Phillips

